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ABSTRACT
Real-time control systems (RTCSs) perform complex control and
require low response times. They typically use third-party software
libraries and are deployed on generic hardware, which suffer from
delay faults that can cause serious damage. To improve availability
and latency, the controllers in RTCSs are replicated on physical
nodes. As physical replication is expensive, we study the alterna-
tive of exploiting virtualization technology to run multiple virtual
replicas on the same physical node. As virtual replicas share the
same resources, the delay faults they experience might be corre-
lated, which would make such a replication method unsuitable. We
conduct several experiments with an RTCS for electric grids, with
multiple virtual replicas of its controller. We find that although the
delay of a virtual machine is higher than of a physical machine,
the correlation between high delays among the virtual replicas is
insignificant, causing an overall improved availability. We conclude
that virtual replication is indeed applicable to certain RTCSs, as it
can improve reliability without added cost.
CCS CONCEPTS
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KEYWORDS
Measurements, Real-Time Control Systems, High Availability, Vir-
tualization, Replication, Delay Faults
ACM Reference Format:
Seyed Alireza Sanaee Kohroudi, Jalal Mostafa, Maaz Mohiuddin, Wajeb Saab,
Jean-Yves Le Boudec. 2018. Experimental Validation of the Suitability of
Virtualization-Based Replication for Fault Tolerance in Real-Time Control of
Electric Grids. In ACM / IEEE International Symposium on Empirical Software
Engineering and Measurement (ESEM) (ESEM ’18), October 11–12, 2018, Oulu,
Finland. ACM, New York, NY, USA, 4 pages. https://doi.org/10.1145/3239235.
3267429
Supported by the “SNSF - NRP 70” Energy Turnaround project and SCCER-FURIES.
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or
classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed
for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation
on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM
must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish,
to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a
fee. Request permissions from permissions@acm.org.
ESEM ’18, October 11–12, 2018, Oulu, Finland
© 2018 Association for Computing Machinery.
ACM ISBN 978-1-4503-5823-1/18/10. . . $15.00
https://doi.org/10.1145/3239235.3267429
1 INTRODUCTION
Real-time control systems (RTCSs) are a subset of cyber-physical
systems that have a response time in the range of a few hundred
milliseconds. Prominent examples are systems that monitor and
control electric grids [2, 8]. These systems are mission-critical as a
failure can have severe economic and safety consequences [1, 6].
Traditionally, RTCSs are deployed using embedded or programm-
able logic controllers (PLCs) [9]. However, the increasing complex-
ity of the control frameworks has led to the use of commercial
off-the-shelf (COTS) industrial computers. Industrial computers
use standard operating systems; and the control software uses off-
the-shelf software. In contrast to PLCs that are known for hard
real-time performance, the industrial computers are soft real-time
and might miss the required target response times. In other words,
the controllers designed with COTS components are particularly
susceptible to delay faults [10, 11, 13], besides crash faults. In order
to mask these faults, RTCSs replicate their controllers on physical
machines (referred to as physical replicas), so that if one controller
experiences a fault, another replica will be available.
Physical controller replication increases the cost of deployment
and maintenance. Advances in virtualization technology enable
virtual machines (VMs) to provide near-native performance [12].
Such performance, coupled with the low cost of VMs, has led to the
use of virtualization-based replication schemes, whereby multiple
virtual-machine replicas (hereafter referred to as virtual replicas)
are deployed on the same physical node [3, 5, 7]. This approach has
been applied to both benign and Byzantine fault-tolerance. How-
ever, it has not been applied to RTCSs with sub-second response
time, where delay-faults are of importance.
Before using virtualization for replication in RTCSs, two ques-
tions need to be answered: (1) As each virtual replica has less com-
puting, memory, and network resources, how does the response
time of the virtual replicas compare to the response time of a phys-
ical replica? (2) As all virtual replicas share underlying hardware,
host operating system, and hypervisor, how are the delay faults on
virtual replicas correlated? By answering these questions, we can
quantify the reliability of virtualization-based replication mecha-
nisms and compare it to that of physical replication schemes.
For this evaluation, we have chosen COMMELEC [2], an RTCS
for electric grids. We perform several experiments with the COM-
MELEC controller running on (1) a single physical machine, and
(2) multiple VMs on the same physical machine. We use the same
code of the COMMELEC controller, as used in a real deployment
in a CIGRÉ benchmark low-voltage microgrid [14]. We find that
the delays of a VM are higher than that of a physical machine.
However, the lack of a significant correlation between the instances
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of the virtual replicas results in the three virtual replicas having
availability higher than the one physical replica.
2 RELATEDWORK
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work on evaluating the
real-time performance of an RTCS under virtualization. Our work
is inspired by [15], where the authors compare the performance
of web applications running on a physical machine to that of the
same applications running on VMs. In contrast to RTCSs, web
applications are not as mission critical and do not have stringent
real-time requirements. So, the authors in [15] focus their attention
on the throughput of the VMs and side-line the response time.
Also, the availability of a web server can be easily measured by
the number of client requests served. However, the availability of
RTCSs is not trivial to formulate and depends on the underlying
physical process, as discussed in [10].
Recent studies demonstrate that the performance of VMs is ap-
proaching near-native performance [12]. This trend of virtualiza-
tion, coupled with its lower cost when compared to investing in
physical replicas, has made it an obvious choice for redundancy
in fault-tolerance architectures [3, 5, 7]. These works propose al-
gorithms for managing VMs in the presence of crash faults [5] or
Byzantine faults [3, 7], to minimize overhead in terms of delay due
to replication. The performance of these fault-tolerance architec-
tures depends heavily on the presence of enough virtual replicas
available to take part in the fault-tolerance algorithm. In this paper,
we focus on quantifying the availability of the virtual replicas, i.e.,
the presence of non-delayed, non-crashed replicas. Thus, the results
obtained here shed light on the feasibility of the fault-tolerance
architectures [3, 5, 7] in RTCSs.
The trend to use COTS components [13] in RTCSs, alongwith the
existence of fault-tolerance architectures such as [3, 5, 7], has led to
efforts in the development of real-time hypervisors [4, 16]. However,
these projects are still in early development phases. Thus, we limit
our performance evaluation to the established Xen hypervisor.
3 THE COMMELEC FRAMEWORK
For our measurement campaign, we used the COMMELEC frame-
work [2], as an RTCS for electric grids. In this RTCS, there is a
central controller, referred to as the grid agent (GA); it communi-
cates with one or more resource agents (RAs), each responsible for
an individual electric resource such as a battery or a photo-voltaic
panel. The control is done in rounds of 60-100 ms. In each round,
the GA receives one measurement from each RA, computes and
issues setpoints of the RAs. Each RA, upon reception of a setpoint,
implements it and waits to accurately sense the change of state (60
ms) before responding with new measurements for the next round.
The goal of the GA is to keep the electric grid in a feasible state,
i.e, respect the ampacity limits of the lines in the grid and prevent
over- and under-voltages. Consequently, the GA must maintain
continuous control of the grid to avoid undesirable effects. So, the
authors of [2] propose to control the electric grid at least once
every 100 ms. Failure of the GA to remain available might result in
violations of the grid constraints, potentially causing a blackout.
An equally important requriement in control is not to implement
old and outdated setpoints, as they could result in a control behavior
that was unaccounted for by the GA. Hence, as described in [10],
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Figure 1: Experimental setup with three virtual GA replicas
we say a setpoint is unsafe to implement if the duration between
the implementation and the reception of the measurements used for
its computation is larger than a certain threshold (τo ). With a cycle
time of 100 ms, of which 60 ms is spent waiting for the duration
of RA sensing, gives an upper-bound of 40 ms on τo as. When the
setpoint is unsafe, we say the GA is delay faulty.
4 MEASUREMENT SETUP
The goal of ourmeasurement campaign is to ascertain if virtualization-
based replication is suitable for mission-critical RTCSs such as
COMMELEC. For this, we perform two sets of experiments with
a GA and an RA. In the first set, we run the GA executable on a
laptop (with same specs as an industrial PC). In the second set, we
deploy the Xen hypervisor on the laptop computer, and instantiate
three VMs, each running the same GA executable, as shown in Fig.
1. The first setup emulates the current deployment of COMMELEC
[14], and the second setup emulates a virtualization-based fault-
tolerance as discussed in the literature [3, 5, 7]. In order to tolerate
f faults, the minimum number of replicas needed is 2f + 1. So, we
use three replicas, need to tolerate 1 faulty replica.
For the GA, we use Lenovo T410, with Debian 9 and kernel
v4.9.3. It has an Intel Quad Core i7 processor and 4GB DRAM. In
the experiments with the Xen hypervisor, each VM is provided with
1 GB DDR3 RAM and one core that is pinned to an isolated physical
core. Note that, with respect to the Xen architectural style, the
hypervisor is acting as a bridge for I/O operations. This isolation of
the hypervisor’s CPU ensures that the I/O operations are performed
without interference from the co-located VMs.
In each COMMELEC cycle, we record the response time of the
GAs, as the time between reception of measurements and issuing
of setpoints at each GA replica. We also record the duration of a
COMMELEC cycle as the time between two consecutive receptions
of measurements at an RA (see Fig. 1). This approach to measuring
cycle time is equivalent to the time between two consecutive set-
point receptions, but is easier to measure in the case of replicated
GAs that send multiple setpoints to the RA.The response time of
each GA is used to characterize the rate of unsafe setpoints, and
the cycle time is used to characterize whether the GA is able to
keep up with the 100 ms target required by COMMELEC. In the
scenario with virtual replicas, due to varying I/O wait-times, the 3
replicas might start computation at different times. To time-align
the COMMELEC cycles on the 3 replicas, we use the Precision Time
Protocol for time-synchronization, with an accuracy of < 1 ms.
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5 EXPERIMENTAL METHODOLOGY
We present results from 5 million samples from each controller:
for scenario 1 with the GA running on a physical machine, and
scenario 2 with the GA replicas running on VMs on the same
physical machine. This is around 5.5 days of COMMELEC runtime.
We use the response time of the GAs to compute two metrics: delay-
fault rate (DFR) and availability.
DFR is defined as the fraction of COMMELEC cycles during
which the GA is delay faulty. A replica is considered delay faulty if
the response time is larger than τo . We obtain DFR as a function of
τo by varying τo in the interval [10, 40] ms. τo = 10 ms represents
high-end scenarios such as unintentional island (disconnection
from the main grid and reconnection, and τo = 40 ms represents
low-end scenarios such as following an external dispatch plan.
While DFR gives an insight into the frequency of occurrence of
faults, it does not capture the effect of duration of delay faults. For
example, if a delay fault in a GA is larger than the maximum cycle
time (100 ms), then it affects at least two consecutive COMMELEC
cycles. Thus, a joint-DFR for multiple GA replicas does not have any
significance. Hence, we use another metric for evaluation, namely
availability, first defined for delay-faulty RTCSs in [10].
We say the GA is available, at a time instant t , if the RA has
implemented a setpoint in the interval [t − 100ms, t]; thereby re-
specting COMMELEC framework’s control deadline. Consequently,
we compute availability using a sliding window across the entire
runtime of the experiment, and by taking the fraction of 100 ms
intervals during which the GA issued safe setpoints.
The DFR of a GA running on a physical machine is expected
to be lower than that of a GA running on a VM because of lower
memory and CPU resources on a VM, and contention between
VMs for the shared resources. However, as the GAs on the VMs are
replicated, their combination might have higher availability than
the controller running on a physical machine.
6 RESULTS
6.1 Response and Cycle Times
Table 1 shows the mean, variance, 99%-ile, 99.99%-ile and the max-
imum response and cycle times of the GA running on a physical
machine (Physical) and virtual replicas (VMi ). We notice that the
GAs running on VMs have similar response times. The mean re-
sponse time of the GA running on the physical machine is 5-8 times
smaller than that of the GAs running on the VMs. This difference
is more pronounced in the tail response-time with the 99%-ile of
the virtual replicas being 10-14 times that of the physical machine.
As noted earlier, this behavior is expected as VMs have shared
resources and face contention for the physical resources.
Although there is a large deviation in the tail response times
from the mean response time of both the physical machine and
the VMs, the corresponding impact on the cycle time is low. This
is because when the response time is low (below 10 ms), majority
of the COMMELEC cycle is spent in sensing the state of the grid
accurately so as to improve the efficiency of the control. However,
when the response time is large (about 18 ms at 99.99%-ile), there
is a substantial impact of delay faults on the cycle time as observed
by high values of cycle time at the same quantile.
It is astonishing to see that a single VM can leave the grid uncon-
trolled for up to a second, i.e., 10x of the required nominal control
cycle of 100 ms. Such behaviour is highly unsafe for real-time oper-
ation of the grid and can result in catastrophes [1]. We conclude
that although single VMs can, on average, maintain the desired
cycle time, they are far from useable, due to a heavy-tailed delay
distribution.
Metric [ms] Physical VM1 VM2 VM3
Mean 0.47, 61.04 2.54, 63.14 3.78, 63.12 3.78, 63.12
Variance 0.47, 0.47 3.82, 4.47 3.92, 4.78 3.82, 4.66
99%-ile 1.09, 61.68 11.56, 72.71 15.28, 75.29 15.33, 75.31
99.99%-ile 1.89, 62.52 16.69, 79.94 18.46, 80.91 18.44, 80.30
Max 305.67,366.162
1006.46,
1067.63
1048.98,
1109.25
997.31,
1057.46
Table 1: Comparison of response and cycle times. 1st entry
in each column is response time and 2nd entry is cycle time.
6.2 DFR and Correlation of Response Times
Next, we look at the DFR of the physical GA, and for each virtual
replica. As explained in §5, we vary τo in the range [10, 40] ms. Fig.
2a shows the DFR as a function of τo for the GAs running on the
physical machine and the three VMs. We find that for time-sensitive
applications such as islanding and reconnection that have τo = 10
ms, each single VM has a DFR of 6.2E − 2, whereas a physical
machine for the same threshold has a DFR of 2.1E − 5. However,
at the other end of the spectrum, for τo = 40 ms, the DFR of a
single VM is 5.3E − 5 and that of the physical machine is 4.1E − 6.
Thus, we find that while a single VM is certainly not suitable for
time-sensitive operations, but its DFR is comparable to that of the
physical machine for less time-sensitive operations.
To get a closer look at how the delay faults in the VMs are related,
we look at the correlation of delays between them. Fig. 2b show the
pairwise scatter plots of delays of VM1 and VM2. The scatter plots
for VM2, VM3, and VM1, VM3 are similar. At the outset, the absence
of points along the line y = x shows that there is no correlation
between the delays larger than 100 ms. However, zooming in at the
range of delays below 50 ms, we see that delays around 10 ms are
highly correlated. This indicates that the combination of the VMs
might not be highly available for time-sensitive applications with
low τo due to simultaneous delay faults in multiple virtual replicas.
We explore this further with the availability metric.
6.3 Availability
Finally, we measure the availability in each experiment, where
availability is defined as the number of 100ms intervals in which the
RA received a valid setpoint. Valid setpoints are ones with response
time smaller than the threshold τo . We compare the availability
of the physical machine with that of one, two, and three virtual
replicas, over several values of τo . The results are shown in Fig.
2c. We observe that the unavailability of one virtual replica is the
highest (results are similar for VMs other than VM1), and that it
decreases with the addition of another virtual replica (results are
also similar with different VM pairs).
Compared to the unavailability of the physical machine, the
unavailability of two virtual replicas is higher for smaller values
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(c) Unavailability as a function of τo .
For τo > 11, no unavailability in 5 mil-
lion runs with 3 virtual replicas
Figure 2: Results on DFR, scatter plot of response times, and unavailability
of the threshold (τo < 13), but it becomes lower for larger values.
For three virtual replicas, the unavailability is comparable to that
of the physical machine for τo < 11. However, for larger τo , we
found no unavailability in 5 million runs, thus, concluding that the
availability at 95% confidence is in the range (0, 7E − 7].
This result is to be expected from the lack of correlation observed
in Fig. 2b of the threshold higher than 11. The 3 VMs never experi-
ence, all at the same time, a delay fault resulting in a response time
greater than 11 ms. This results in availability of 1 in those cases.
It is clear from Fig. 2c that using three replicated VMs signifi-
cantly improves the availability of the GA over one physical ma-
chine, for τo ≥ 13 ms. To further confirm this result, we performed
a statistical test for all values of τo in the interval [10, 40] ms. We
split the data into 20 sub-experiments each representing approxi-
mately 6 hours of execution time with 250,000 samples. We used
these sub-experiments to obtain two series of availabilities, one
each for the physical GA and replicated virtual GA, for each value
of τo . Then, we applied the two-sided student t-test, to obtain one
p-value for each value of τo . For all values of τo ≥ 12 ms, the value
was close to 0, indicating a strong significance in availability im-
provement. For τo = 10 ms and τo = 11 ms, however, we obtained
p-values of 0.95 and 0.65, respectively, which does not indicate
any significant improvement in availability due to the replicated
virtual GAs. As three virtual replicas were enough to improve the
availability over one physical machine, we did not experiment with
additional replicas, also due to the limited number of cores.
7 CONCLUSION
We study, via experimental validation, if virtualization-based repli-
cation is a suitable method for improving reliability in real-time
control of electric grids. We perform two sets of experiments using
the actual code of an RTCS of electric grids: COMMELEC. The first
set involves running the COMMELEC code on a physical machine,
and the second set involves running three replicas of the code, each
on a VM, co-located on the same physical machine. We observe
that each VM has higher response times, subsequently a higher
DFR, than the physical machine. Whereas, we observe that the cor-
relation of delay faults is insignificant between the virtual replicas.
This results in an overall improvement in availability at no extra
hardware cost. Consequently, exploiting virtualization is indeed a
suitable replication method for RTCS. We plan to deploy the vir-
tualized architecture of COMMELEC in the on-campus microgrid,
and to obtain in-field measurements for a longer duration.
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